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THE UNITARINESS FINDING AND ITS EFFECT ON
MANDATORY DESEGREGATION INJUNCTIONS
INTRODUCTION

Once intentional segregation by school authorities is proved,' the federal courts clearly are empowered,' indeed obligated, 3 to draft relief that6
quickly 4 and effectively' abolishes the unconstitutional school system,
1. Because the plaintiffs in a segregation case invoke the equal protection clause,
they must prove that the segregation complained of results from state (or a state agent's)
actions that have a discriminatory purpose. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 74445 (1974); see infra notes 32-46 and accompanying text. See generally Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (declaring that, in general, any victim of discrimination seeking to invoke the constitutional protection of the equal protection clause must
show intentional discrimination by public officials).
2. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (after reargument
concerning the appropriate remedy in school desegregation cases, the Court instructs the
district courts to fashion and effectuate decrees to remedy instances of unconstitutional
segregation).
3. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (Court declared that "federal
courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate remedies" if local conditions conflict with
minority students' constitutional rights); Davis v. School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37
(1971) (once a violation is proven, district courts or local authorities "should make every
effort" to implement a school system that is consistent with constitutional requirements);
Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School, 778 F.2d 404, 433 (8th Cir.
1985) (once a violation is established, the district court has duty to devise a desegregation
remedy), cert. denied, 106 S. CL 2926 (1986); United States v. DeSoto Parish School Bd.,
574 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.) (school board obligated to implement an effective remedy),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); cf Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)
(once it is proven that a discriminatory voting plan violated plaintiffs' equal protection
rights, the Court declares that the district court has "not merely the power but the duty
to render a decree" that eliminates past discriminatory effects and prevents future discriminatory effects).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (remedy must be effectuated
"with all deliberate speed"). Since Brown, the Court has expressed frustration with delays in implementing effective desegregation plans and stressed the need to accomplish
desegregation at the earliest possible date. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam) (school officials are obligated to terminate
unconstitutional school systems at once); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439
(1968) (any desegregation plan must "realistically ... work now") (emphasis in original).
5. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,460 (1972) (plan must promptly
and effectively terminate unconstitutional school system (citing Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968)); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,
46 (1971) ("all reasonable methods [must] be available to formulate an effective remedy"); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) ("The measure of any
desegregation plan is its effectiveness."); see also Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971) (desegregation plans must be "reasonable, feasible and workable"); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966)
("The only desegregationplan that meets constitutionalstandardsis one that works.") (emphasis in original), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 840 (1967).
6. The basis of any desegregation remedy is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, which provides "that no State shall 'deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). In Brown v. Board
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and institute a system that protects the rights guaranteed by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7 To achieve these ends,
district courts are empowered to issue mandatory injunctive decrees prescribing a specific course of conduct to be followed by local school
authorities.'
of Educ., the school system violated the equal protection clause by excluding black students from schools attended by white students "under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race." 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). Since Brown, the violation has
evolved to encompass any "'current condition of segregation resulting from intentional
state action.'" Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (quoting Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973)). Thus, it is no longer necessary that a victim of
discrimination identify a state law that permits or requires segregation. Rather, the focus
is on whether school officials, acting as agents of the state, have demonstrated a subjective
discriminatory intent. See infra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
7. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. There is no standard model of the "constitutional" school system. For example, in large urban centers the existence of one-race
schools does not necessarily mean that a system is unconstitutional. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). The existence of such schools
may be due to demographic conditions arguably not caused by government action. See
id. at 31-32. But see id. at 32 (a risk exists that local officials may attempt to "fix or alter
demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools").
Rather than focusing on what was probably an unenforceable end result (a prejudicefree society), the Brown decisions concentrated on the complexities facing district courts
attempting to initiate desegregation efforts where local officials have failed to accomplish
desegregation. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (Brown II). The Brown I Court did,
however, discuss in general terms what constitutes an unconstitutional school system.
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. The segregation redressed in Brown was unconstitutional because it "deprived [minority students] of the equal protection of the laws." Id. Replacing
unconstitutional systems with systems according students equal protection of the laws
"presents problems of considerable complexity." Id.
This Note focuses on the problem of determining when this constitutional violation has
been eradicated and the manner by which a court should relinquish its jurisdiction in a
case. Direction by the Supreme Court in these areas has been scant at best. See
Gerwirtz, Choice in the Transition:School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 728, 791-92 (1986). This lack of direction is probably due to the factspecific nature of each desegregation remedy. As one court has noted, a determination of
whether a school system has reached a constitutional status turns on the specific facts of
each case. See Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983);
cf Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971) (discussing the
extent of permissible judicial relief in desegregation cases, the Court notes that fixed
guidelines are not feasible).
8. In the context of school desegregation, courts have granted mandatory injunctive
relief in a variety of forms. A court may require faculty assignments intended to specifically redress racially disproportionate school staffing. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1971); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1969); McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199,
200-01 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972). Courts may also set fixed racial
ratios as starting points in the desegregation of an unconstitutionally segregated school
system. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 25. But see Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424, 435-36 (1976) (holding that the use of fixed racial quotas is inappropriate once a
school system is unitary). Additionally, courts may redress unconstitutional segregation
through the remedial altering of attendance zones in the school district containing the
violative school system. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28. Court-ordered busing of students to
schools outside of students' neighborhood has also received judicial approval. See id. at
30; Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
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Local officials, however, have a countervailing right to regain control
of the school system once the injunction has achieved its remedial purposes.' Reconciling this right of control with the remedial aspects of the
injunctive decree presents problems for courts attempting to determine
In limited situations, courts may order funds allocated to specified programs. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1977); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218,
233 (1964); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816
(1984); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 786-87 (6th Cir. 1980). Further, a court is empowered to redress past harm caused by unequal educational opportunities by ordering remedial education programs. See Milliken, 433 U.S. at 283-84; Stell v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1967).
9. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976) (Limiting the district court's remedial power, the Court states that "the District Court was not
entitled to require the [school district] to rearrange its attendance zones each year so as to
ensure that the racial mix desired by the court was maintained in perpetuity."); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971) (" [s]chool authorities have
the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving these problems"' (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955)); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) ("local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition"); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (concern for local
autonomy in public educational matters); San Antonio School Indep. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (same); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972)
("[d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a need
that is strongly felt in our society"); id. at 478 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Local control is
not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as well."); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski
County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 434 (8th Cir. 1985) ("the important
interests ... school districts have in managing their own affairs"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2926 (1986); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir.) (a
school desegregation "remedy must still attempt to respect local autonomy and local
political processes"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
The basis of this countervailing right is that when the court mandates certain conduct
by school authorities it acts in an administrative rather than judicial capacity, thereby
intruding into areas normally not within its domain. See Gerwirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 597 (1983) (injunctive decrees in desegregation cases "are frequently attacked as exceeding a court's remedial powers, on the ground that they
interfere with the defendant's discretion to take steps that would not themselves violate
the Constitution"); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope ofFederalEquitable Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661, 662, 706-23 (1978) (discussion of the Supreme Court's concern
that district court intrusions into local administrative matters be restrained).
The intrusion occasioned by mandatory injunctive relief in school desegregation cases
is at least as problematic in other cases in which the courts use this remedy to redress
government misconduct that infringes on constitutional rights. See Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: InstitutionalRemedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 Yale LJ. 635,
635-37 (1982). For instance, in the area of prison reform (where prisoners' constitutional
rights are at issue), the courts have been especially sensitive to the interests of state and
local officials to govern with minimal intrusion by the federal judiciary. See Toussaint v.
McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Injunctive relief against a state agency
or official must be no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation.");
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir.) ("duty to protect inmates' constitutional
rights, however, does not confer the power to manage prisons, for which courts are illequipped"), amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (1982) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Newman v. State, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1977) (courts
should take "less intrusive, more effective approach"), modified sub nom. Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
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when the injunction should be dissolved.' ° In particular, dispute surrounds whether a district court's finding that a school system is "uni-

tary"'1 should automatically dissolve the original mandatory injunctive
decree.12

10. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court noted that
the fact-specificity of each desegregation case would make the formulation of decrees
problematic and complex. Id. at 495. After reargument limited to the appropriate remedy, the Brown Court directed federal courts to take advantage of equity's "facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294, 300 (1955). The reconciliation of various competing interests in desegregation cases
is a difficult task. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32
(1971); see also Gerwirtz, supra note 9, at 589-608 (noting the specific difficulties courts
face in drafting desegregation decrees that not only reconcile competing interests but also
effectively redress the constitutional violation). The balancing of competing interests that
occurs when courts formulate relief is at least as necessary when a court is considering
the termination of the relief. See Gerwirtz, supra note 7, at 789-98 (discussing the complexities attendant on the termination of a court's role in a desegregation case); see also
United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1037-38 (5th Cir. 1986)
(requiring three years of compliance reports and full and open hearings when determining unitariness to take sufficient account of the significant consequences of such a declaration); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983)
(whether to terminate a desegregation injunction is a fact-specific issue).
11. "Unitary" is a term of art in desegregation cases describing a school system
"within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or
color." Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
The federal courts have articulated time and again that a unitary school system is the
goal of a school desegregation remedy. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 458-59 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
200-01 n.11 (1973); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
436 (1968); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983); Graves v. Walton County Bd.
of Educ., 686 F.2d 1135, 1143 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647
F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Adams v.
United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1286 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
12. This Note focuses on the conflicting views of the effect of a unitariness finding as
recently articulated by the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. Compare Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.) (after a finding of unitariness,
school board was no longer under court order to bus), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 420 (1986)
with Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir.) (despite a finding of
unitariness, school board remains bound by order to bus until that order is modified or
dissolved), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 420 (1986). For a detailed discussion of these two
cases, see infra notes 87-141 and accompanying text.
In addition, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits recently addressed the effect of a finding of unitariness on an enjoined party's duty to abide by the
terms of a mandatory injunction issued in a school desegregation case. In United States
v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1986), the court affirmed a
lower court holding that a previous finding of unitariness did not excuse the school officials of their obligations under the desegregation plan originally mandated by the court to
remedy unconstitutional segregation. Id. at 1036, 1060. In another recent case, United
States v. Board of Educ., 794 F.2d 1541 (1lth Cir. 1986), the court stated in dictum that
a finding of unitariness would not necessarily require a court to vacate otherwise operative decrees. Id. at 1543. These two cases, taken with Riddick and Dowell, provide the
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This confusion generally arises in the following context.' 3 After
school authorities have complied with the terms of a mandatory injunctive decree for a number of years, the issuing court renders a finding that
the school system is "unitary." The finding of unitariness, however, is
silent regarding the mandatory injunctive decree: it contains neither an
express dissolution or modification nor an express retention of the decree.
Further, for a number of years following the finding of unitariness, local
school authorities continue to abide by the terms of the original
mandatory injunctive decree.
Confusion begins once school authorities decide to depart from the
terms of the original injunctive decree. In response, a group of students
or parents challenges the actions of the school authorities and moves to
compel compliance with the terms of the mandatory injunction. Both
the parties and the courts have opposing views on the significance a finding of unitariness has on the original injunctive decree. Absent a showing by the plaintiffs that discriminatory intentions motivated the decision
to engage in a new course of conduct, are the school authorities free to
follow this course of conduct in reliance on the finding of unitariness
without regard to the terms of the original decree? 4 Or, are the terms of
the original injunctive decree still enforceable, despite the finding of
unitariness, thereby requiring the school authorities to justify to the court
modification or dissolution of the original decree to accommodate the
new course of conduct? 5
Two federal courts recently used conflicting approaches to determine
the effect of a finding of unitariness. One approach, promulgated by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, gives such a finding the effect of
automatically dissolving the injunctive decree. 6 The evidentiary conse-

quence of this view is that after a finding of unitariness, plaintiffs must
prove a new prima facie case of intentional segregation to survive summary judgment. 7 This is a very difficult evidentiary burden," which, if
factual groundwork for the analyses undertaken in Parts III and IV of this Note. See
infra notes 87-169 and accompanying text.
13. The facts of this hypothetical are taken substantially from Dowell v. Board of
Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986), and Riddick v.
School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). which will be
discussed at length in Part III of this Note. See infra notes 87-141 and accompanying
text.

14. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
16. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 107 S.Ct. 420
(1986) (once an order is entered declaring the school system unitary, the school board is
no longer under a court order to abide by the terms of a previously decreed mandatory
busing plan).
17. See id. at 534; infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
18. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972); United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400,412 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978);
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 470-71 (1979) (Stewart, J.,concurring)
("Whether actions that produce racial separation are intentional... is an issue that can
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not satisfied, bars plaintiffs from challenging the new conduct.' 9
Under the second approach, applied by the Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit, a finding of unitariness, alone, does not effectively dissolve
or modify an otherwise effective injunctive decree.2 0 The evidentiary re-

sult of this view is that plaintiffs opposing board conduct that deviates
from the terms of the original injunctive decree need only show that the
deviation occurred.21 If this evidentiary burden is met, the school board
must convince the court that the deviation was justified and that modification or dissolution of the original injunctive
decree is desirable to ac22
commodate the new course of conduct.
This Note concludes that a fact-specific approach is preferable to an
"automatic dissolution" approach to determine the effect of a finding of
unitariness. The primary basis for this conclusion is that a fact-specific
approach to the unitariness finding better accommodates the competing
interests of plaintiffs and school officials. The analysis supporting this

conclusion is presented in four Parts. Part I examines the vital role injunctive relief plays in the school desegregation context. Part II briefly
examines factors ordinarily considered by federal courts before modifying or dissolving injunctions. Part III examines the application of the
contrasting approaches used to determine the effect to be given a finding
of unitariness. Part IV recommends an analytical framework that effec-

tively reconciles the competing interests present in a desegregation suit.
I.

BROWN AND ITS PROGENY: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASES

Brown v. Board of Education held that the operation of separate but

equal schools violated the equal protection rights of students.23 In particular, the Supreme Court condemned school systems that assigned stu25
24
dents to different schools on the basis of race ("dual school systems").
present very difficult and subtle factual questions.") (citations omitted); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("intractable problems involved in litigating [the issue of segregative intent] are
obvious to any lawyer"); id. at 261 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The 'intent' with which a
public body performs an official act is difficult enough to ascertain under the most
favorable circumstances. Far greater difficulty is encountered if we are to assess the intentions with which official acts of a school board are performed over a period of years.")
(citations omitted); cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (difficult to prove subjective intent of public officials to discriminate); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (difficult to determine the subjective intent of a
group of legislators).
19. See Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 543-44 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986).
20. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1520-21 & n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
21. See id. at 1523.
22. See id.; infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
23. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Id. at 488.
25. "Dual school system" is a term of art in school desegregation cases meaning a
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'
Such school systems were to be abolished with "all deliberate speed," 26
and in their place, local authorities were to establish school systems that
would not effectively exclude pupils from schools on the basis of race
("unitary school systems")." The federal district courts were charged
with the duty of overseeing the implementation of unitary school systems2 8 that abolished unconstitutional school segregation "root and
branch." 2 9 The post-Brown courts, however, were left to articulate on a
case-by-case basis both the standards for determining when a school system was unconstitutional" and the means available to the courts to remedy such a violation.3"

A. De Jure Segregation
What is it about school segregation that violates the rights protected
under the equal protection clause? The resolution of this question determines when and how a court should respond to a segregated school sysschool system in which "the State, acting through the local school board and school
officials," enforces a system that is "part 'white' and part 'Negro.'" Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (reargument concerning the
proper remedy in school desegregation cases); see supra note 4.
27. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam);
see also supra notes 6 & 7.
28. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955); see also supra notes 2 & 3.
29. Unconstitutional school systems were "clearly charged with the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-59
(1979) (citing to "root and branch" language of Green); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (same); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988
(4th Cir. 1985) (same); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (8th Cir.) (same),
cerz. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), found that the equal protection
clause was violated by segregation under "laws requiring or permitting segregation." Id.
at 488. Subsequently the Court expanded its interpretation of equal protection violations
to encompass intentional discriminatory actions by public officials, even when no law
required or permitted the conduct. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457
n.5 and cases cited therein (1979).
31. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) ("This
Court, in Brown I, appropriately dealt with the large constitutional principles; other federal courts had to grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day implementation of those constitutional commands."); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,439
(1968) ("There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is
obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case."); see also Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 494 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court "did not define what it meant by 'efrectuat[ing] a
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system,' ..... and therefore the next 17
years focused on the question of the appropriate remedy" (quoting Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)) (citation omitted) (bracket in Penick); Shane, School
Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. Pa. L Rev. 1041,
1047-48 (1984) ("In the face of Supreme Court silence as to whether a narrow or expansive restorative approach is appropriate in desegregation cases, lower courts are unlikely
to produce consistent remedial opinions.").
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tern. 32 For the Supreme Court, the violation rests on a showing of
discriminatory intent.33
The early desegregation cases set out standards of judicial intervention
that are still applied today. In the 1960's civil rights groups attacked
southern segregation.34 In accordance with Brown, district courts
stepped in to oversee desegregation efforts where local authorities defaulted on Brown's mandates. Because southern states had articulated
their discriminatory purposes openly, indeed, often in statutes, 35 judicial
intervention was easily reconciled with the state action requirement of
32. The nexus between the nature of the violation and the scope of the remedy has
been articulated by the federal courts on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977) ("[tlhe power of the federal courts to
restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities" can be exercised only
where there is a constitutional violation); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)
("[T]he nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope
of the constitutional violation."); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974) ("federal
remedial power may be exercised 'only on the basis of a constitutional violation' and, '[a]s
with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.'"
(quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)) (bracket
in Milliken)); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 687 F.2d 510, 514 (1st Cir. 1982) (school desegregation remedy must be tied to the violation); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs,
637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir.) (remedy must be tailored to fit the nature of the violation),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
33. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) (plaintiffs in a
desegregation action must "'prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that
it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action'" (quoting Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973)); see also United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir.) (desegregation remedy must be based on a
showing of discriminatory intent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978); Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 793 (6th Cir. 1974) (same);
Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 181 (6th Cir. 1974) (same), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
34. See generally J. Bolner & R. Shanley, Busing: The Political and Judicial Process
57-67 (1974) (overview of congressional action during the 1960's aimed at redressing
southern segregation); P. Dimond, Beyond Busing at v (1985) ("In the late 1960s and
early 1970s ... the legal challenges to official segregation moved from the rural to urban
areas and from South to North. . . ."); J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke 78-87 (1979)
(general discussion of efforts to desegregate southern schools between 1955 and 1970).
35. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 255-56 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (in the South, laws required segregation); id. at 220 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (same); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1954) (Court attacked segregative results of "laws requiring or permitting segregation
according to race"); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir.
Unit A May 1981) (Texas law required separate schools for black and white students),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280 (8th
Cir.) (Missouri constitution required separate schools for black and white students), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 467 F.2d 1187,
1189 & n. 1 (6th Cir. 1972) (Tennessee law required separate schools for black and white
students); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1962) (Louisiana law required separate schools for black and white students); see also United States
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 867-68 (5th Cir. 1966) (condemning the
use of zoning laws to effectuate "apartheid" in public schools), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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the equal protection clause.3 6 To determine whether there was a violation, the courts inquired whether the state imposed the segregation alleged by plaintiffs3 7 ("de jure" approach).
This de jure requirement remains in school desegregation cases,38 as
well as other equal protection cases." The retention of this requirement,
originally tailored to southern desegregation," raises certain problems in
northern and more recent southern desegregation cases.4" Northern
school segregation is far more likely, especially in large urban centers, to
stem from factors that are not easily tied to purposeful discrimination by
school authorities.4" If the discriminatory purpose is not expressed by
school officials, 3 proving discriminatory intent becomes a more difficult
evidentiary burden.' As a result, it is more likely that discriminatory
36. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits "states" from
depriving citizens of equal protection of laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. As a result,
if a state law expressly provides for the unequal treatment of citizens, a victim of discrimination may readily invoke the equal protection clause. See cases cited supra note 35.
37. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 219-20 (1973) (Powell, J.,concurring
in part, dissenting in part); id.at 255-56 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). Although early
southern segregation cases dealt with state laws requiring or permitting invidious discrimination, the existence of such laws is not a requirement for invoking the equal protection clause. Rather, actions of state officials that may be illegal under state law are
attributable to the state on an agency theory. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 457 n.5 (1979) (Keyes established this agency approach in the school desegregation
context); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (under an agency theory,
conduct by local officials can be attributed to a state to satisfy the state action requirement of the equal protection clause).
38. See supra note 33.
39. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (requiring proof of discriminatory intent in housing discrimination);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (m establishing intent requirement in
hiring discrimination case, Court reviewed other areas in which discriminatory intent is
required before the equal protection clause may be invoked).
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. The focus of desegregation efforts did not shift from the South until the early
1970's. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring
in part, dissenting in part); see also P. Dimond, supra note 34, at v (the Supreme Court
did not focus on northern and urban segregation until the early 1970's); J. Wilkinson,
supra note 34, at 195 (same).
42. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 480-81 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (The "state imposed" segregation redressed in Brown is not present in major
urban areas where segregated schools are caused by "social, economic, and demographic
forces for which no school board is responsible."); see also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, 221 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (northern
segregation posed "the vastly different factual setting of a large city with extensive areas
of residential segregation, presenting problems and calling for solutions quite different
from those in... rural setting[s]"); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d
400, 412 (7th Cir.) ("[fIn an age when it is unfashionable for state officials to openly
express racial hostility, direct evidence of overt bigotry will be impossible to find."), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Fiss, The Charlotte-MecklenburgCase-ItsSignificancefor
Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 697, 698 (1971) ("[S]tudents in the
North are assigned to schools, not on the basis of race, but instead on the basis of a
seemingly innocent criterion-geographic proximity.").
43. See supra note 42.
44. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

effects of official action will go unremedied because plaintiffs cannot connect the effect with a specific discriminatory intent.4 5

Despite the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, this requirement of the prima facie case remains for any party attempting to remedy

what it views as unconstitutionally segregative pupil assignments.46
B.

The Supreme Court's Approval of Mandatory Injunctive Relief

Once discriminatory intent is established, the court's duty is to draft
effective relief.47 Brown instructed that lower courts should be guided by
the standards of equity when drafting relief.48 The Supreme Court later
elaborated on this instruction, providing three equitable principles to
guide courts in drafting a remedy.4 9 First, the remedy must take account
45. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218-19 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (referring to the lack of progress in desegregating nonsouthern cities because of the retention of the de jure/de facto distinction); see also Hart
v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 51 (2d Cir. 1975) (arguing against a
"literal" intent standard because it will not adequately address conditions in areas outside
the South).
Some pre-Keyes decisons involving northern and urban segregation focused on segregative effects rather than discriminatory intent to reach urban segregation. See Pride v.
Community School Bd., 488 F.2d 321, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[T]he district court acted
properly in receiving evidence on discriminatory intent without considering the issue controlling."); see also Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543, 544-46 (D.
Mass. 1965) (invoking importance of providing "equal educational opportunities" to all
children to hold in favor of plaintiffs in a desegregation case despite no evidence of intent), vacated, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208,
228-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (The harmful effects caused by dejure segregation of Brown is as
likely to result from de facto segregation because school children "are not so mature and
sophisticated as to distinguish between the total separation of all Negroes pursuant to a
mandatory or permissive State statute based on race and the almost identical [de facto
segregation] prevailing in their school district."); Fiss, supra note 42, at 706-07 (focus in
school desegregation cases should be on unequal effects of government action, rather than
on whether these effects were intended). But see Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F.
Supp. 819, 828 (N.D. Ind.) (discriminatory intent required for proof of de facto segregation to indicate a constitutionally violative school system), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
46. See supra note 33.
47. See supra note 5.
48. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) ("[i]n fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles"). In light of Brown's
directive, the Court later noted that the scope of equitable powers enacted to remedy past
wrongs is very broad. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977); Liddell v. Missouri, 731
F.2d 1294, 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Valley v. Rapides Parish
School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 938 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982), aff'd on
rehearing, 702 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 914 (1983).
49. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977); see also Little Rock School
Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 433 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2926-27 (1986); Lee v. Anniston City School System, 737 F.2d
952, 955 (11th Cir. 1984); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1305-09 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 687 F.2d 510, 514-17 (lst Cir. 1982);
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 838 (1980); cf Edwards v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1985) (challenge to the constitutionality of statute, court invokes Milliken for district court's broad
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of the nature and scope of the violation." Second, the remedy should
restore the students, to the greatest degree possible, to the position they
would have occupied absent the violation." Finally, the courts should
take into consideration the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs in accordance with the Constitution. 2
To effectuate the commands of Brown and subsequent cases, courts

have prohibited discriminatory practices and prescribed remedial con-

duct by means of injunctive relief. 3 Among the courts' prescriptions
have been pupil assignment goals,54 pupil reassignment, including the use
of mandatory busing to non-neighborhood 7schools," the expenditure of
funds 6 and remedial education programs.5

The use of mandatory injunctive relief to establish unitary school systems works well for several reasons. First, the prevailing parties in these
cases require relief that not only declares the status quo unconstitu-

tional,5" but also compels local authorities immediately to undertake the
establishment of a unitary system.

9

By requiring specific conduct, a

mandatory injunctive decree discourages unnecessary delays. 60 Further,
equitable power to restore to victim what was foregone as a result of the violation), superseded, 789 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally Shane, supra note 31 (general discussion of equitable concerns articulated by the Court in Milliken).
50. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977); see also supra note 38.
51. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280; see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406, 423-24 (1977) ("judicial decree to accomplish [desegregation] must be formulated
with great sensitivity to the practicalities of the situation, without ever losing sight of the
paramount importance of the constitutional rights being enforced"); Shane, supra note
31, at 1047 (the "broad restorative purpose for school desegregation remedies [is] to restore the victims of discrimination to the position they would otherwise have enjoyed but
for the occurrence of discrimination").
52. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280-81; see also supra note 9.
53. See infra notes 54-57.
54. See Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
55. See id. at 29-31; United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211, 122324 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978);
Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
56. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1977); Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1320 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 786-87
(6th Cir. 1980).
57. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 283-86 (1977); Stell v. Board of Pub.
Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1967).
58. See McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (the unconstitutional "status quo
...is the very target of all desegregation processes"). The status quo at issue is the dual
school system. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
59. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968) (on finding a voluntary student transfer plan ineffective, Court requires that any desegregation plan accomplish desegregation immediately); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
60. The primary complaint of the Green Court was that some school systems did not
act immediately on Brown's mandate. Green, 391 U.S. at 438; see also Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971) (referring to Court's response to
"dilatory tactics of many school authorities"). As a result, the Court directed school
boards to present plans that "promise[ld] realistically to work now." Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original). To effectuate Brown's mandate may require changes that cannot be accomplished effectively by voluntary compli-
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as with all permanent injunctions with prospective effect,6" the issuing

court retains jurisdiction over the enjoined party for as long as the injunction is extant.6 2 With this jurisdiction, a court
is able to use its con63
tempt powers to enforce the terms of its decrees.
Second, the retention of jurisdiction enables a court to compel school

authorities to meet, and act in spite of, third party opposition that may
accompany attempts to enforce orders to desegregate. 6'

The issuing

ance plans. See id. at 440. Thus, the courts have approved mandatory busing and other
remedial measures. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Gerwitz, supra note
9, at 588 (intrusive mandatory injunctive relief evolved as the only way to effectively
desegregate public schools).
61. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) ("A continuing decree
of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may
shape the need."); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2961, at
599 (1973) ("continuing responsibility of the issuing court over its decrees is a necessary
concomitant of the prospective operation of equitable relief") (footnote omitted),
62. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (during remedial period
courts retain jurisdiction over the parties). The primary purpose of retaining jurisdiction
is to allow a court to fulfill its obligation "to redraft the order" to accomodate changes in
facts that may render the original decree ineffective or inequitably oppressive vis-a-vis the
enjoined party. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 61, § 2961, at 600.
63. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 438 (1976) ("Violation
of an injunctive decree such as that issued by the District Court in this case can result in
punishment for contempt in the form of either a fine or imprisonment."). The injunction
acts in personam. D. Dobbs, Remedies § 2.10, at 105 (1973). Failure to comply with an
injunction, therefore, constitutes contempt. Id. § 2.9, at 94; see Howat v. Kansas, 258
U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) (as long as an order remains extant, it must be obeyed, and
"disobedience ... is contempt").
64. See United States v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804, 817 (5th Cir.) (fear
of resistance by school faculty and the community "cannot be allowed to defeat" an
otherwise effective desegregation plan), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); see also
Gerwirtz, supra note 9, at 588 ("judicial remedies became so intrusive largely because
public resistance precluded alternative methods for making Brown a reality").
Resistance to school desegregation comes from various sources. See, e.g., Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971) (referring to the dilatory
tactics of school authorities); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964)
(referring to resistance by state legislature to school desegregation); Little Rock School
Dist. v. Pulaski City Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 417 (8th Cir. 1985) (referring to state resistance to school desegregation); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1306
(8th Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804, 817 (5th
Cir. 1978) (referring to faculty resistance to school desegregation).
Additionally, white residents of a school district undergoing desegregation on occasion
have resisted the desegregation effort by moving from the school system ("white flight").
Gerwirtz, supra note 9, at 587; Note, White Flight as a Factorin DesegregationRemedies:
A JudicialRecognition ofReality, 66 Va. L. Rev. 961 (1980). In Riddick v. School Bd.,
784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986), the School Board took into
account white flight in its determination to change the desegregation plan to attract
whites back to the community. Id. at 526-27. The changes in the plan had significant
resegregative effects, challenged by students and parents. See Motion for Leave to File
and Brief Amici Curiae of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law at 12-15,
Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.) (No. 85-1962), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420
(1986) (brief in support of petition for certiorari). At issue under such circumstances is
whether the goal of attracting whites to return to the school system (possibly providing a
more integrated school system in the long term) justifies short term resegregative effects.
Id. Although the district court accepted the school board's arguments that curbing white
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court can compel by threat of contempt an otherwise unwilling school

board.65 Similarly, the court can provide some judicial backbone to a
school board that is willing but unable to act in the face of opposition."
Additionally, the mandatory injunctive decree is flexible.67 The Brown
Court instructed courts to draft relief suitable to local needs, keeping in
mind the flexibility and responsiveness that should accompany equitable
relief.68 Mindful of this directive, courts may exercise their inherent
power to modify or dissolve a decree to accommodate changing events
that make the original decree inequitable or ineffective.6 9 Under certain
circumstances these changes may justify the modification or dissolution
of the original decree by the issuing court.7" Thus, either the enjoined
party or the beneficiary of an injunction has an opportunity to come into

court and voice objections to the terms of the original decree. These attributes of injunctive relief have made it the remedy of choice in school

desegregation cases.
II.

WHETHER TO MODIFY OR DISSOLVE AN INJUNCTIVE DECREE:
DETERMINATIVE FACTORS

To protect judicial authority, courts insist that an enjoined party abide
by the terms of an injunctive decree until the decree is modified or dissolved.71 The factors relevant to any decision to modify or dissolve an
flight is a legitimate policy goal, Riddick, 784 F.2d at 529 (referring to the district court
opinion), such a treatment of white flight is staunchly opposed by civil rights groups. See
Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amici Curiae of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law at 12-15, Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.) (No. 851962), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
65. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (because voluntary
desegregation plan was ineffective, "[tihe Board must be required" to institute an effective
remedy) (emphasis added).
66. See supra note 64 for cases in which resistance to desegregation came from parties
other than the school board.
67. See United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1056 (5th Cir.
1986) ("By its forward cast, an injunction contemplates change and thus must be sufficiently malleable to adapt the ordered relief to contemporary circumstances.") (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also supra note 61. See generally
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) ("[a] continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the
need"); D. Dobbs, supra note 63, § 2.10, at 111 (ability to modify an injunction "adds to
the flexibility of the remedy").
68. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
69. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (codifying this power); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 58, § 2961, at 599.
70. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
71. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976) (because of
concern "that outstanding injunctive orders of courts be obeyed until modified or reversed," the Court notes that "even though the constitutionality of the Act under which
the injunction issued is challenged, disobedience of such an outstanding order of a federal
court subjects the violator to contempt even though his constitutional claim might be
later upheld"); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293-94 (1947) (judicial authority requires that enjoined party obey the terms of the injunction until its dissolution); see also United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 120 (1932) ("What was then
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injunction have been set forth both in the context of school segregation

suits and in other cases involving injunctive relief.
A.

The "Equity" Standard of Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codifies the inher-

ent power of an issuing court to modify or dissolve its decrees."2 Rule

60(b) provides that this power may be exercised if "it is no longer equita-

ble that the judgment should have prospective application." 7 3 The Rule,
however, uses only general terms, leaving the development of more definite standards to the courts. 74
Because circumstances will vary from case to case, courts do not apply
a fixed standard to resolve a request to modify or dissolve an injunction. 7" As an initial proposition, however, courts will not address the
propriety of the original remedy.76 Instead, the inquiry is limited to
whether that remedy is no longer effective or necessary.7 7 When a party
seeks to escape the further impact of an injunction, three factors generally are assessed. The court will first consider any changes in circumstances that may have rendered the injunction unnecessary to protect the
rights of the original plaintiffs.78 Second, the court will examine whether
solemnly adjudged as a final composition of an historic litigation will not lightly be undone at the suit of the offenders, and the composition held for nothing."); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) (orders of a court are to be obeyed and respected and
"disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority").
72. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 61, § 2961, at
599.
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
74. See System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1961) (circumstances
of law and facts involving a motion to modify or vacate an injunction require that "there
must be wide discretion in the District Court"); SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F.2d
457, 459 (10th Cir. 1972) ("motions to vacate injunctions are addressed to the discretion
of the court"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973); Winfield Assocs. v. Stonecipher, 429
F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1970) (same).
75. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 61, § 2961, at 601.
76. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) ("The injunction,
whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions
that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting."); United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1056 (5th Cir.
1986) ("a motion to modify an injunction cannot be used as an occasion for re-trying the
original premises of the judgment") (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); see also Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1964) (Rule 60(b) motion is
not a substitute for a direct appeal); Morse-Starrett Prods. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244, 249
(9th Cir. 1953) (same). See generally 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 61, § 2961, at
601 ("the availability of modification is not a substitute for a direct appeal from a
judgment").
77. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968) (chief
consideration is whether the "purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree" has
been achieved); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-20 (1932) (court inquires
whether the injunction is still necessary to protect the beneficiary from the risks that
motivated the original decree).
78. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968); United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1932); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist.,
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new circumstances effect a hardship for the enjoined party if the injunctive decree remains unchanged.7 9 Finally, the court will address whether
a change in the law has made the application of the terms of the original
decree improper." These factors also are relevant if a party seeks to
modify the relief provided by the injunction to better accommodate the
injunction's original remedial purpose."1 In such a case, the primary focus is on whether a change in circumstances has rendered the relief, as
originally drafted, less effective as a means of achieving the goals of the
original decree. 2
B.

Using Rule 60(b) to Determine the Effect of a Past Finding of
Unitariness

Normally, the inquiry under Rule 60(b) is whether present circumstances justify modification or dissolution of the injunctive decree., 3 The
factual situation examined in this Note,8 4 however, requires an inquiry
699 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1983); SEC v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, 433 F.2d 304, 305 (10th
Cir. 1970); Brooks v. County School Bd., 324 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1963).
79. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S 106, 119 (1932); Brooks v. County
School Bd., 324 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1963) (imaddition to attenuated need, the enjoined party must make a showing of extreme hardship resulting from the continued
application of the injunction).
80. In the desegregation context these changes are far more likely to involve changes
in decisional law. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (in
light of a Supreme Court decision proscribing the use of fixed racial quotas once desegregation is underway, Court directed district court to modify injunction to remove the
proscribed terms). For other modifications resulting from changes in decisional law, see
Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776, 778-81 (5th Cir. 1954); Coca-Cola v.
Standard Bottling, 138 F.2d 788, 789-90 (10th Cir. 1943).
A decision to modify an injunction may also be caused by a change in statutory law.
See System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961); United States v. Ward, 352
F.2d 329, 331 (5th Cir. 1965).
81. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1968).
82. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 252 (1968) (requiring the district court to modify the injunctive decree "to achieve the required result with
all appropriate expedition"); United States v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804,
817-18 (5th Cir.) (in school desegregation case injunction modified because it failed to
completely effectuate its remedial purpose), cert denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); Brewer v.
School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 947-48 (4th Cir.) (plan modified to include free transportation
to make the plan more effective), cert denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); see also Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-40 (1968) (denouncing freedom of choice plans
and requiring adoption of a more stringent plan because the former produces only negligible results).
Although one would normally expect a beneficiary of an injunction to seek modification to better effectuate the decree's remedial purpose, this will not always be the case.
See Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 526 (4th Cir.) (the School Board argued for a
change in the busing requirements of a desegregation plan to better effectuate the original
purpose of the injunctive decree), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
83. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976); United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). The focus is on current circumstances because
normally the inquiry would be initiated by a current motion under Rule 60(b) to modify
or dissolve the injunction.
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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into the circumstances existing more than five years before the suit. 5
Because in each case reviewed in Part III it was asserted that the past
finding of unitariness freed the enjoined party of its present obligations
under the original injunction,8 6 the inquiry to test this assertion must be
retrospective. The examination must be whether circumstances at the
time of the finding of unitariness justified modification or dissolution of
the injunctive decree. Although retrospective inquiry is difficult, it is the
only way a court can properly determine whether the finding of unitariness was indeed intended to dissolve or modify the original injunctive
decree.
III. RIDDICK AND DOWELL: DETERMINING THE EFFECT OF A
FINDING OF UNITARINESS

Although the results of Riddick v. School Board and Dowell v. Board of
Education differ significantly,8 7 each court justified its result by invoking
85. The delay in litigation of the unitariness finding's effect on the original decree is
explained by the facts of Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986), and Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 526 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). In neither case was the finding rendered in response
to a motion specifically seeking the modification or dissolution of the injunction requiring
busing. The Riddick order containing the finding was entered into on the consent of the
parties after the district court had overseen the Board's compliance with the busing order
for nearly four years. Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814, 818-19 (E.D. Va. 1984),
aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). In Dowell, the finding
of unitariness was rendered on a motion by the School Board to close the case. Dowell,
795 F.2d at 1518.
Of even more significance is that neither the Riddick nor the Dowell School Boards
initially treated the unitariness finding as an order dissolving an injunctive decree. If the
respective School Boards were seeking to have the busing order lifted when the unitariness finding was made, and the issuing court intended the finding to dissolve the injunction, then it is very likely that the School Boards would have stopped busing by the terms
of the injunction as soon as the finding was rendered. It was not until 1983 in the Riddick
case and 1984 in the Dowell case, however, that the respective School Boards sought to
engage in conduct that deviated from the terms of the original decree. Riddick, 627 F.
Supp. 814, 817-18 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986); Dowell, 606 F. Supp. at 1551-52 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 795
F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
Finally, neither finding of unitariness made direct reference to the injunction requiring
busing. See Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1519; Riddick, 784 F.2d at 525. Thus, the issue of the
finding's effect on the original mandatory injunction remained dormant until the Board
sought to depart from the terms of that injunction.
86. In Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986), the government, as amicus, asserted that on a finding of unitariness, all orders, including remedial busing orders, are terminated. Id. at 1520.
On the other hand, in Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 420 (1986), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the view that after
a finding of unitariness, the enjoined party was "no longer under court order." Id. at 525.
Although the Riddick court did not expressly address whether the injunction requiring
mandatory busing terminated upon the finding of unitariness, the court's decision has
been interpreted as meaning that a finding of unitariness dissolves the original mandatory
injunction. See Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1520 n.3.
87. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
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some of the concerns previously articulated by the Supreme Court

88

Analysis reveals, however, that the Riddick court chose among the equitable concerns voiced by the Supreme Court, rather than trying to accomodate all. 89
A.

Riddick v. School Board

In Riddick v. School Board, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court decision refusing to enjoin the adoption of a

new pupil assignment plan.'

The new plan abolished the mandatory

busing required by a 1971 injunctive decree. 9 ' The district court viewed
a 1975 unitariness finding as definitively terminating the court's role in
the desegregation of the Norfolk schools. 92 Therefore, unless plaintiffs
a new instance of de jure segregation, no relief could be
demonstrated
93
had.

The 1975 order was issued after the School Board had complied with a
mandatory busing order for three years. 94 After concluding in 1975 that
88. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
90. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 543-44 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986).
91. Id at 526-27.
92. According to the court, the 1975 finding meant that the Board had discharged its
affirmative duty to desegregate its schools. Because this duty was discharged, the court
refused to act unless the plaintiffs could show that the School Board's actions were motivated by discriminatory intent. Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814, 820 (E.D. Va.
1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. CL 420 (1986).
93. Id at 820. Generally, where a school board is under a duty to desegregate, it
bears the burden of justifying its conduct as nonsegregative. See Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1979). On a finding of unitariness, however, the Riddick
district court allocated to the plaintiffs the burden of showing that the challenged board
conduct was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 820.
For the plaintiffs in a desegregation case, this shifting of the burden of proof can have
an important practical effect: premature termination of the desegregation injunction. See
infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. This Note, by focusing on whether the original injunction should remain extant after a finding of unitariness, attempts to provide an
analytical framework to ensure that such a shifting of the burden of proof occurs only
when it is warranted by the facts. An alternative manner to safeguard plaintiffs' rights in
such cases has been suggested. See Note, Allocating the Burden of ProofAfter a Finding
of Unitariness in School DesegregationLitigation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 653 (1987). The
author suggests that, with regard to the allocation of evidentiary burdens, the court
should focus on the effects of the new desegregation plan, without inquiring whether the
unitariness finding actually dissolved the original injunction or not. Id at 669. Under
this approach, if plaintiffs can offer a prima facie showing that the new plan would have
resegregative effects, the school board bears the burden of proving, even after a unitariness finding, that the new plan is not motivated by discriminatory intent. Id. The analysis suggested in Part IV does not presume that the unitariness finding dissolved the
original injunction. Rather, the primary purpose of the suggested analysis is to determine
whether the unitariness finding was intended to dissolve the injunction. The shifting of
evidentiary burdens is a secondary issue to be reached only after the threshold inquiry
suggested has been made.
94. Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814, 818 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521
(4th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). After busing was mandated in 1971, the
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the School Board had met its obligation to rid the system of "racial dis-

crimination through official action" and that the system was "unitary",
the court dismissed the case.9 5 The 1975 order, however, made no men-

tion of the original injunctive decree: the court neither expressly retained
nor expressly dissolved the injunction.9 6

The finding of unitariness, however, had no immediate effect on the
School Board's practices. The Board continued busing students by the

terms of the original injunctive decree for eight years after the finding of

unitariness.9 7 In 1983, however, the School Board, pointing to demo-

graphic shifts within the boundaries of the school system, 98 abolished

mandatory busing in elementary schools, adopting in its place a voluntary transfer program. 9 9 Responding to the School Board's decision, a
group of parents and students commenced an action to enjoin the Board
from adopting this new pupil assignment plan."° The district court denied the plaintiffs relief.1 °1
In affirming the district court decision, the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit impliedly approved of treating a unitariness finding as
effectively dissolving a mandatory desegregation injunction.10 2 In the

court's view, once a school system was adjudicated unitary, "the burden

of proving discriminatory intent attaches to a plaintiff."' 3 As a result of
this evidentiary allocation, the school authorities were free to adopt a

new plan without regard to the terms of the original injunction, absent a
showing by the plaintiffs that the new plan was adopted for a discriminatory purpose.'

4

school board was required to file reports detailing the school systems's operation in accordance with the plan. Id.
95. Id.
96. The text of the 1975 order containing the unitariness finding read as follows:
It appearing to the Court that all issues in this action have been disposed of,
that the School Board of the City of Norfolk has satisfied its affirmative duty to
desegregate, that racial discrimination through official action has been eliminated from the system, and that the Norfolk School System is now "unitary,"
the Court doth accordingly ORDER AND DECREE that this action is hereby
dismissed, with leave to any party to reinstate this action for good cause shown.
Id. at 818 (emphasis in original).
97. After the 1975 order, the school system continued to bus students by the terms of
the original decree until 1983, when the plan challenged by the Riddick plaintiffs was
actually adopted. Id. at 817.
98. Id. at 817.
99. Id. at 818. Under the voluntary transfer program ("Majority-Minority transfer
option") any student attending a school where his race constitutes more than 70% of the
student body could transfer "to a school in which his race constitutes less than 50% of
the student body." Id.
100. Id. at 816.
101. Id. at 827.
102. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.) (according to the court, after
the finding of unitariness, the school board was "no longer under court order" to bus
students), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
103. Id. at 538.
104. Id. at 538-39.
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B. Dowell v. Board of Education

Riddick's treatment of the unitariness finding'

was expressly rejected

by the Tenth Circuit in Dowell v. Board of Education.'

6

In particular,

the Dowell court objected to Riddick's treatment of a unitariness finding
as "an order dissolving a mandated integration plan."' 0 7

As in Riddick, the issue before the Dowell court arose on an appeal
from a district court decision denying injunctive relief sought by students
and parents who had moved to reopen the case to compel the School
Board's compliance with a term of the original injunctive decree mandating busing.'0 8 According to the district court, a 1977 order declaring the
school system unitary, among other effects, allocated to plaintiffs the bur-

den of 9proving that the new plan was motivated by discriminatory
intent.l1

The 1977 order was issued after the School Board had complied with a

court-mandated desegregation plan for five years.1 '0 As in Riddick, the

plan required mandatory busing."' After concluding in 1977 that the
plan had "worked and that substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements [had] been achieved," the court dismissed the
case." 2 Although the court stated that it did not "foresee" that dismissal

would "result in the dismantlement of the Plan...,"' " the 1977 order
did not expressly retain or dissolve the original injunction."'
For seven years after the unitariness finding, the Oklahoma City Board

of Education continued mandatory busing."'

In 1984, however, the

Board abolished the crosstown busing of students in grades one through

four and implemented a plan similar to that adopted by the Norfolk
105. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
106. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1520 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 420 (1986).
107. Id
108. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1518-19 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 420 (1986).
109. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (WV.D. Okla.), rei'd and remanded, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
110. Id at 1550-51.
111. Id at 1550.
112. The text of the 1977 order containing the unitariness finding read in part:
The Court has concluded that... [the Finger Plan] was indeed a Plan that
worked and that substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements
has been achieved. The School Board, under the oversight of the Court, has
operated the Plan properly, and the Court does not foresee that the termination
of its jurisdiction will result in the dismantlement of the Plan or any affirmative
action by the defendant to undermine the unitary system so slowly and painfully accomplished over the 16 years during which the cause has been pending
before the Court.
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420
(1986).
113. Id
114. See id
115. Dowell, 606 F. Supp. at 1551-52 (a new plan was adopted in December 1984).
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Board of Education." 6 As in Riddick, the plaintiffs challenged a new
desegregation plan that abolished the mandatory busing term of the orig-

inal injunctive decree." 7 The district court denied the plaintiffs relief,
treating the unitariness finding essentially as had the Riddick court. I 8I
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case." 9 According to the court, absent "any specific or implied alteration" the origi-

nal injunction "retain[s]

its vitality and prospective effect. '"12

Accordingly, the Dowell court treated the case before it no "differently

from any other case in which the beneficiary of a mandatory injunction
seeks enforcement" of the terms of an extant decree. 12 1 As a result, the
court held that the School Board was not free to act without regard to
the original injunction. 2 2 Despite the finding of unitariness, 123 the

school officials bore the evidentiary burden of proving on remand that
"changed conditions" justified modification or dissolution of the injunc24
tion to accommodate the new plan.'
C. Analysis: PracticalEffects and Concerns Articulated
Riddick's and Dowell's differing treatments of the unitariness finding

had significant practical consequences for the parties in each case.' 2

Under Riddick's approach, any challenge to board conduct made after
a finding of unitariness was treated as a prayer for new relief.126 As a
116. Id. at 1551-54. The chief similarities between the two new plans were (1)that
elementary school students would no longer be bused to non-neighborhood schools and
(2) the adoption of voluntary transfer programs. Id.at 1552; Riddick v. School Bd., 784
F.2d 521, 526-27 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct 420 (1986).
117. Dowell, 606 F. Supp. at 1549.
118. Id. at 1556 (requiring that plainitffs show discriminatory intent before upholding
a challenge to a new desegregation plan); see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
119. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420
(1986).
120. Id.at 1519.
121. Id.at 1520.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 112.
124. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1523.
125. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
126. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 536-37 (4th Cir.) (court relies heavily on
rationale of cases in which parties seek "additional remedial orders" to justify requiring
plaintiffs "to carry the burden of proving discriminatory intent") (citing Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)), cer. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). Such reliance on cases in
which plaintiffs sought new relief may have been a mistake by the Riddick court. The
court recognized the factual distinction between those types of cases and the case before
it. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537. In particular, the Riddick court noted that in both Spangler
and Swann the Court was addressing a situation where a plaintiff sought relief to redress
segregation due to natural demographic shifts outside the school board's control. Id. In
such cases, the Supreme Court stated that new relief would be denied absent a new showing by plaintiffs of discriminatory intent. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 434-37; Swann, 402 U.S.
at 32. In both Riddick and Dowell, however, neither group of plaintiffs sought to redress
natural demographic shifts. Instead, the plaintiffs were seeking to enforce the terms of a
previously decreed injunction, abandoned as a result of unilateral school board action.
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result, plaintiffs were required to tie their challenge to a new instance of
intentional discrimination.12 7 Proving the subjective intent of the board
members is no easy task. 2 Therefore, the Riddick approach, by allocating this evidentiary hurdle to plaintiffs, hinders their ability to challenge
official conduct once a system has been adjudicated unitary.
By contrast, Dowell treated the plaintiffs' challenge of board conduct
as a legitimate effort to compel compliance with the terms of an extant
decree.12 9 Accordingly, the court assigned school officials the burden of
presenting evidence that "changed conditions" justified modification or
dissolution. 130 For plaintiffs, this treatment of the case permits challenges to school board conduct that might effect a reversion to a dual
system"' without also requiring that plaintiffs meet the difficult evidentiary burden of proving a new instance of dejure segregation. "32 In addiSee supra notes 113 & 122 and accompanying text. When plaintiffs have sought to enforce the terms of an extant injunction, at least one circuit court of appeals has expressly
stated that the court should not require of plaintiffs a new showing of discriminatory
intent "in order to enjoin the challenged conduct." Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639
F.2d 1243, 1263 (5th Cir. 1981). The Lee court also stated that such an injunction "is not
a grant of further or broader relief than that already ordered, but is, instead, a means of
ensuring that the original remedial order is not evaded or eviscerated." Id. Thus, the
crucial issue in a factual situation like Riddick and Dowell should be whether the injunction survived the finding of unitariness. This is precisely the inquiry suggested in Part IV
of this Note. See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
127. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 538 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420
(1986).
128. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
129. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1520-21 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 420 (1986).
130. Id at 1523.
131. In Riddick, it was alleged, and proof was offered, that the new desegregation plan
would result in a greater number of nearly all-black schools than existed under the original desegregation plan. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). Despite this proof of resegregative effects, the plaintiffs' claims did
not survive summary judgment because the plaintiffs could not prove that the adoption of
the challenged desegregation plan was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Riddick,
784 F.2d 521, 543.
On the other hand, once a showing of resegregative effects was made, the Dowell court
cautiously treated the determination of the unitariness finding's effect on the original injunction. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986). The Dowell court did not automatically require either party to bear the
greater evidentiary burden. Rather, the court first inquired whether the 1977 unitariness
finding had dissolved or modified the original injunctive decree. Id. at 1519. Concluding
that the unitariness finding had not dissolved or modified the original decree, the court
remanded the case, ordering an inquiry into whether present circumstances justified modification or dissolution of the original decree to accomodate the new desegregation plan
adopted by the school board. Id at 1523. The type of analysis undertaken by the Dowell
court provides a skeletal model for the analytical framework offered in Part IV of this
Note. See infra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
132. Under the Dowell approach, as long as the original injunction remains in force,
plaintiffs' evidentiary burden is to show only some deviation by the board from the terms
of the original injunctive decree. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). On such a showing, the enjoined party is required to prove that the desired change in the terms of the original decree is justified by
changed circumstances. Id
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tion, this approach requires that before departing from the terms of the

original injunctive decree, the school board must come into court and
justify modification
or dissolution of the decree to accommodate new
33
conduct. 1
Although both the Riddick and Dowell courts articulated some of the
proper concerns for assessing the relief at issue,13 1 neither court gave full
treatment to the equitable concerns articulated by the Supreme Court. 13"

When devising and implementing school desegregation remedies, courts
were instructed to consider the nature and scope of the violation, the
restorative purpose of the remedy and the interests of state and local

authorities in managing their own affairs in accordance with the Constitution. 136 Although the courts invoked the Supreme Court's guidelines to
justify their results, each took a different tack toward the latter two considerations. 137 The Dowell court focused more on the restorative purpose
of the original injunction, 138 while the Riddick court expressed more concern for the rights of local authorities. 1
140
Although the Dowell and Riddick courts reached divergent results,
their differences are not irreconcilable. Only by considering both the re-

133. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1523. This treatment accords with the cases cited supra note
71.
134. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
137. Compare Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir.) (focusing on
plaintiffs' interest that relief be complete), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986) with Riddick
v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539 (4th Cir.) (focusing on the interests of local officials),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
138. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1519-20. For the Dowell court, the chief concern was to avoid
premature dismissal of plaintiffs' actions. Id. at 1523. To ensure that the original plan
had achieved its restorative purpose, fairness dictated that the parties have "ample opportunity to develop the substantive issues." Id. Dowell's result clearly follows from this
concern. Rather than upholding the summary dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, the court
remanded the case, ordering an inquiry into whether present circumstances justified the
dissolution or modification of the original plan. Id.
139. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539, 543-44. The Riddick court expressed more concern for
the interests of local officials to regain control of the school system at the earliest possible
date. The court concluded that after a unitariness finding, "control of the system must be
allowed to return to local officials." Id. at 539. To justify its conclusion, the court invoked the right of these officials to manage their own affairs once the constitutional violation had been eradicated. Id. at 539, 543-44. The court failed, however, to consider
whether every adjudication of unitariness indicates that the injunctive decree had completely served its restorative purpose. Id. at 539.
The effect given the unitariness finding by the Riddick court has been expressly challenged by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795
F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 420 (1986)). In addition, other courts of
appeals have implicitly rejected the Riddick court's approach. See United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1986) (district court's description of school system as "unitary" does not, by itself, excuse school officials from
their obligations under a previously mandated desegregation plan); United States v.
Board of Educ., 794 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating in dictum that a finding of
unitariness would not necessarily require a court to vacate otherwise operative decrees).
140. See supra notes 102-04 & 119-24 and accompanying text.
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storative purpose of the original relief and the rights of local officials, 4 '
can a court determine the proper effect to accord a finding of unitariness.

IV. A RECOMMENDED

FRAMEWORK TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT
TO ACCORD A FINDING OF UNITARINESS

This Note recommends an analytical framework intended to reconcile
the nature of a unitariness finding 4 2 with the competing interests of parties involved in desegregation cases."4 3 Although the inquiry suggested is
not an easy one, 1" it is warranted by the important practical consequences attendant to the effect given a unitariness finding.

A.

The Recommended Framework

The analysis has two stages. Stage one looks to the plain language of
the order containing the finding of unitariness. The inquiry is whether
this order expressly dissolved or modified the injunction. 4 s On the one
hand, if the original injunction was expressly dissolved or modified by the
order, then a court should treat the unitariness finding as dissolving or
modifying the injunction in dispute. As a corollary, the court should
apply the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata to bar plaintiffs
from seeking relief under the terms of the original decree. 46 To contest
141. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
143. Since Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), courts have been charged
with drafting equitable relief that attempts to reconcile different interests. Id. at 300. ("In
fashioning and effectuating [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable
principles.... characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a
facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.") (footnotes omitted); see
also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (when drafting a desegregation
remedy, the district court should consider not only the restorative goal of the remedy, but
also the local officals' interest in autonomy in local affairs); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (the trial court's "task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the
Constitution"); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th
Cir.) (any school desegregation remedy must be fashioned to fit the violation and also
respect local autonomy and political processes), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); United
States v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.) (desegregation decree,
while it must be effective, should also be "sensitive to the burdens that can result from a
decree and the practical limitations involved"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); Hart v.
Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 53 (2d Cir. 1975) (courts must attempt to
"equalize the inconveniences" of a desegregation plan); Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508
F.2d 779, 793 (6th Cir. 1974) (court should take care to avoid unfair allocations of the
burdens of a desegregation plan).
144. The inquiry requires, in part, a retrospective analysis as described supra notes 8386 and accompanying text.
145. Neither the Dowell order nor the Riddick order expressly modified or dissolved
the original injunction. See supra notes 96 & 114 and accompanying text.
146. Under the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata, "a 'right, question or
fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction
... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies
....'"Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quoting Southern Pac. R.R.
v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)). Thus, if an issue is directly determined by a
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such a unitariness finding, plaintiffs must appeal the express dissolution
effected in the unitariness finding. 4 7 Where the injunction is expressly
modified, the court retains jurisdiction over the enjoined party. Thus,
plaintiffs can move under Rule 60(b) 148 and attempt to justify modification of the decree to accommodate their ends. On the other hand, if the
plain language of the order containing the unitariness finding does not
expressly dissolve or modify the original injunction,' 4 9 the court should
not imply such dissolution or modification merely from the finding of
unitariness.15 0 The court would then proceed to the second stage of the
analysis.
Stage two of the recommended analysis is applicable when the order
containing the finding of unitariness did not expressly dissolve or modify
the original injunction.'-5 This stage focuses on the factors that motivated the court to render the finding of unitariness. 5 2 If these factors
court, a party to the earlier action will be barred from raising the issue in a subsequent
suit even if it involves a different cause of action. Id.
While the issue of unitariness was directly determined by the Riddick court, the 1975
order clearly did not directly determine whether the mandatory desegregation injunction
would survive the finding of unitariness. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Thus, it is confusing that the court applied the principles of collateral estoppel to bar
plaintiffs' claims. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 531 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 420 (1986). The plaintiffs in 1984 were not challenging whether the system was unitary in 1975, an issue clearly determined in the 1975 order. Rather, the Riddick plaintiffs
were challenging the decision to implicitly accord such a finding the effect of dissolving
the original injunctive decree. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 534.
147. Dissolution of an injunction will only be appealed if the beneficiary of the injunction has actual knowledge of the dissolution. When a judicial decree directly addresses
the injunction and expressly dissolves it, such notice is provided. If, however, the order
containing the finding of unitariness does not mention the injunction and the board continues to abide by the terms of the injunction after the unitariness finding has been rendered, the statutory period for appeal is likely to expire before plaintiffs are even aware
that the order implicitly dissolved the original injunction. In both Riddick and Dowell the
unitariness findings were silent as to the injunction and the respective school boards continued to bus by the terms of the original injunction for more than five years after the
finding was made. See supra notes 97 & 115 and accompanying text. In such circumstances, it clearly would be unfair to apply the principles of collateral estoppel or res
judicata to the plaintiffs' challenge to the new board conduct if the plaintiffs had no notice
of the previous implied dissolution of the injunction. This unfairness was noted by the
Dowell court and reflected in its decision that the 1977 unitai'ness finding did not dissolve
the original injunction. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
148. See supra notes 72, 73 and accompanying text.
149. In neither Riddick nor Dowell did the order containing the finding of unitariness
expressly modify or dissolve the original injunction. See supra notes 96 & 114 and accompanying text.
150. The Dowell court, expressly criticizing the outcome in Riddick, stated that the
Riddick court had mistakenly accorded the unitariness finding the effect of automatically
dissolving the original injunctive decree. See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516,
1520 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
151. For examples of orders containing a unitariness finding, see supra notes 96 & 112.
152. This analysis is retrospective because the finding of unitariness was issued before
the question of its effect on the original injunction became an issue. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
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ordinarily would justify dissolution or modification of the injunction
under a standard previously articulated by the court for deciding such an
issue,"' 3 the finding of unitariness should be treated as effectively dissolving the original injunction (or modifying the specific term sought to be

enforced). Thus, if the motivating factors of the unitariness finding ordinarily would justify the court's dissolution or modification of the injunc-5
tion, 54 the principles and options of the first stage of this test apply)
If, however, such dissolution or modification ordinarily would not be jus-

tified by the factors under consideration, 5 6 the injunction should not be

dissolved by implication. The result of the latter situation is that plain-

tiffs may continue to seek enforcement of the terms of the original injunction after a finding of unitariness has been rendered without any

additional showing of discriminatory intent.'5 7 To escape the impact of
the injunction, the school officials would have to justify modification or
dissolution of the decree to accommodate the desired 5conduct under the
issuing court's modification or dissolution standards.' 1
B. Advantages of a Fact-Specific Analysis
The factual specificity of this analysis accommodates the ambiguities
and inconsistencies of the unitariness finding.'5 9 These ambiguities exist
153. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
156. For instance, the injunctive decree may still be necessary to protect the interests
that motivated the issuance of the original injunctive decree. In Riddick and Dowell the
school boards continued to abide by the terms of the original injunctive decree for a
number of years after the finding of unitariness. See supra notes 97 & 114 and accompanying text.
157. See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 420 (1986).
158. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
159. See United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir.
1986) (unclear what issuing court intended by its finding of unitariness); United States v.
Board of Educ., 794 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986) (adjudication of unitariness does
not always mean that issuing court must "vacate the orders upon which the parties have
relied" in accomplishing the unitary system); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983,
989 (4th Cir. 1985) (the effect of a unitariness finding "was merely to relieve the Board of
its obligation to file periodic compliance reports"); Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1426
(1 1th Cir. 1985) (use of the word "unitary" alone is not "to be equated with the unitary
status that requires dismissal of the action"); Lee v. Anniston City School Sys., 737 F.2d
952, 956 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) ("district court's statement that a unitary system has been
achieved suggests that its continuing remedial jurisdiction over the... school system may
be coming to a close") (citations omitted).
An example clarifies this point. The attitudes of school authorities regarding desegregation may ordain the effect a court intends to give to its finding of unitariness. For
instance, where school authorities are not predisposed to continuing a dual system, and
use their best efforts to effectuate a unitary system, a finding of unitariness may be issued
as soon as the dual system is abolished. In rendering this finding, the issuing court may
consider the apparent attitude of the school authorities and the resultant likelihood that
these authorities will not attempt a reversion to a dual system. Under such circum-
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because the fact-specific nature of desegregation cases"w makes it difficult
to establish empirical standards regarding the appropriate time for the
courts to entirely relinquish their involvement. 6 I
Because there is no fixed standard of unitariness, courts may intend

differing effects from such a finding.' 62 Thus, the importance of a fact-

specific approach. By looking first at the plain language of the decree

containing the finding of unitariness, the analysis suggested will give effect to the express intentions of the court. Absent an expression of intent
in the decree, the court looks to the motivation behind the issuance of the
finding of unitariness. Effective discernment of intent by retrospective

inquiry, however, requires a thorough investigation of the circumstances
at the time the unitariness finding was made. To be less than thorough
presumes judicial intent and merely chooses one party's interests over
163
those of the other party, rather than reconciling the interests of both.

Such a choice, contrary to the Riddick court's implication, is not required to protect the officials' interest in managing school affairs.'"
Even if the inquiry of the past finding of unitariness does not reveal an
intent to dissolve the injunction, the enjoined party is free to argue
that
dissolution or modification.' 65

present circumstances justify such

stances, the issuing court may intend its finding of unitariness to effect a complete relinquishment of its control and a dissolution of the original injunction.
Where school authorities resist the desegregation effort, however, the issuing court may
intend an entirely different effect for its finding of unitariness. Under such circumstances,
it is possible that the school authorities will attempt a reversion to a dual system once the
court relinquishes its control over the system. Thus, the issuing court may intend a more
limited effect for its finding of unitariness. For instance, the court may no longer require
the compilation and filing of annual compliance reports, but may want to keep the original injunction effective to discourage school authorities from manipulating attendance
plans to effectuate a reversion to a dual system.
160. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (referring to the "great
variety of local conditions" and the resultant complexities of formulating remedial decrees); Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1983) (referring to unique circumstances present in each of three desegregation cases); Ross v. Houston Indep. School
Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he decision that public officials have satisfied their responsibility to eradicate segregation ... must be based on conditions in the
district, the accomplishments to date, and the feasibility of further measures.").
161. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 697, 697 (1971) (difficult to determine at what point a
school system is "unitary"); Gerwirtz, supra note 7, at 792-93 (same); see also Wilkinson,
supra note 34, at 157 (After a school desegregation case is closed, "[h]ow long busing
must continue, and under what conditions it can be lifted, remains uncertain.").
162. See supra note 159.
163. To merely give lip service to an inquiry of intent would frustrate the chief purpose
of the analysis offered, the prevention of the premature termination of injunctive desegregation relief. Further, such a result would conflict directly with Milliken v. Bradley,
which implicitly required a balancing test, rather than a selection among various interests. 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977).
164. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539, 543-44 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 420 (1986).
165. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. A Rule 60(b) motion is the appropriate source for the enjoined party's relief when, as in Riddick and Dowell, the school
board wants to deviate from the terms of the injunction years after the finding of unitari-
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Thus, a fact-specific approach recognizes a school board's valid assertion that the injunction was dissolved in the finding of unitariness. More
important, the primary risk of an automatic dissolution approach is attenuated. By applying the analysis suggested, it is less likely that the
injunctive relief will be terminated before it has completely served its
restorative purpose.
The inquiry suggested serves another purpose. A fact-specific approach encourages the careful drafting of prayers for relief and requires
courts to reach issues concerning the obligations of the enjoined party
after a finding of unitariness has been rendered. As a result, the consistent application of a fact-specific approach to determine the effect to accord a unitariness finding would help to lessen the confusion attendant
on such a finding.
CONCLUSION

Brown v. Board of Education expressly directed lower courts to use
their equitable powers to the greatest extent practicable to accomplish
the desegregation of public schools. Subsequent courts have only reinforced this mandate. Accordingly, the task of the federal courts is far
from simple. The Supreme Court directs that each of the competing interests in a desegregation case deserves thorough consideration. These
interests are as relevant at the termination stage as they are at the drafting stage. Neither school officials nor students and parents possess a paramount interest when a court is asked to terminate its role in a
desegregation case. Rather, the balancing mandated by the Court must
accompany all stages of the case to ensure that important interests are
not compromised by reaching a quicker or simpler result. Only by considering all the concerns articulated by the Supreme Court can a lower
court justify terminating the relief originally issued to combat unconstitutional segregation.
L. Kevin Sheridan, Jr.
ness. In such circumstances, the enjoined party should not be able to side-step the inquiries attendant to such a motion by asking a court to give the finding of unitariness,
rendered years earlier, the effect of automatically terminating the injunctive decree. The
Supreme Court's view is clear on this point: the terms of an injunction are to be obeyed
until the decree has been modified or dissolved by the issuing court. See cases cited supra
note 71. Further, the Court has provided factors for an issuing court to consider when
deciding whether to modify or dissolve an injunctive decree. See supra notes 72-82 and
accompanying text. In view of the clear direction provided by the Court in the general
area of terminating injunctive decrees, it makes little sense to ignore these standards when
deciding whether a school desegregation injunction should be modified or dissolved.

